Hermione's Sophism: Ordinariness and Theatricality in The Winter's Tale by Wolfe, Judith
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
??????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????
Access provided by University of St. Andrews Library (14 Jun 2016 11:33 GMT)
???????????????????????????????????
Philosophy and Literature, 2015, 39: A83–A105. © 2016 The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Judith Wolfe
HERMIONE’S SOPHISM: ORDINARINESS AND 
THEATRICALITY IN THE WINTER’S TALE
Abstract. This essay queries and extends Stanley Cavell’s reading of 
Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale by a close investigation of the character 
and language of Hermione. Far from being merely a passive victim 
of Leontes’s madness (or, in Cavellian terms, “skepticism”), I argue, 
Hermione is an active contributor to the disintegration of their rela-
tionship by “sophistically” refusing to distinguish between language 
as conversation and language as mere play. The play’s conspicuously 
metatheatrical engagement with Hermione’s (as Leontes’s) repudiation 
of vulnerability shows that the threat of “theatricalization” or sophism 
cannot (as Cavell or Rush Rhees might wish) simply be excised but must 
be integrated in ordinary relationships.
For both Rush Rhees and Stanley Cavell, Wittgenstein’s late inves-tigations into language and language games are caught up with a 
profound underlying concern about the possibility of discourse itself. 
Rhees and Cavell isolate two such conditions, which are closely related. 
The first, emphasized by Cavell, is what he calls “acknowledgment.” In 
his seminal essay “Knowing and Acknowledging” (1969), Cavell engages 
traditional skeptical arguments against the possibility of knowing other 
minds. Unlike most philosophers, however, Cavell does not attempt to 
repudiate the skeptic’s concerns by devising a proof of the existence 
of other minds or a method for knowing them with certainty. Any such 
proof, he argues, would merely perpetuate the skeptic’s fundamental 
mistake that it is indeed knowledge that is called for in this context. But 
the skeptic is absolutely right in complaining that we cannot know other 
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minds; his error lies in analyzing this problem as an “intellectual lack” 
rather than as what it really is, namely a “metaphysical finitude”: the 
fact that humans are irremediably separate.1 In Cavell’s analysis, the 
skeptic’s wish to cast this separation as a limitation of knowledge is a 
symptom of the more general human wish to escape the full impact of 
human finitude: the unbridgeable gap between us and those we love, 
the inability to hold the world as a stable possession. 
It is to register this difference between intellectual and existential or 
“metaphysical” limitation that Cavell introduces the concept of acknowl-
edgment as the form or inflection of knowledge proper to the case of 
knowing other minds. It underscores two things. One, knowledge of 
others is not automatic, but rather involves an element of openness 
and choice, and so also of unavoidable risk: it is always susceptible to 
dissembling, misunderstanding, and loss. Two, because every person is 
already situated within the human community, a refusal to “know” oth-
ers is never an autonomous and therefore authoritative decision, but 
to some extent a failure to fulfill one’s responsibility toward others—in 
other words, a denial of acknowledgment.2 To refuse such acknowledg-
ment is to exile oneself from the only environment in which thinking, 
discourse, and understanding are possible; conversely, to exact such 
acknowledgment from someone is to misunderstand the voluntary and 
precarious nature of the community of speakers in which our language 
and our understanding have their life.
This appeal to community and acknowledgment, however, depends on 
a recognition of the unity of what we call the ordinary. Accordingly, the 
second condition for the possibility of discourse, which is the particular 
concern of Rush Rhees, is the fundamental unity of discourse—the unity 
not of a calculus but of a conversation. Rhees’s account of this unity 
arises from a query of certain aspects of Wittgenstein’s concept of “lan-
guage games,” first articulated in Rhees’s influential essay “Wittgenstein’s 
Builders.” Pace Wittgenstein’s (supposed) claim that the abbreviated 
orders “Slab!” and “Brick!” shouted by one builder to another could 
in theory constitute the entire language of a tribe, Rhees here argues 
that no language game could exist in isolation. Without being situated 
in a surrounding life—the common project of building a house, the 
homecoming after a day of work, the future residents’ anticipation of 
the completion of the project—the builders’ orders and the reactions 
they elicit would not constitute genuine human responses but merely 
behavioral reflexes. Therefore, they could not be called language at 
all. Underlying this argument is the assumption that language is, at its 
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most essential, conversation, and that the meaning of language depends 
on the meaningfulness of life as a whole. As Rhees repeatedly writes, 
“Understanding makes sense if living makes sense.”3
On this construal, understanding consists not (primarily) in the 
mastery of facts but in the ability to discern the meaning of a specific 
utterance made by a specific person in a specific context, and to consider 
and evaluate possible responses to that utterance. This ability does not 
exclude but rather depends on a deployment of one’s own subjectivity. 
It is in this sense that, as Cavell also emphasizes, genuine conversation 
both depends on and elicits self-knowledge. 
This, however, means that the heuristic description of language as 
a set of games is potentially misleading. Unlike a game, an individual 
discursive situation or practice cannot be divorced from its participants 
or its larger context—the peripheral situations and circumstances that 
come to bear on it—without losing its specifically human character. 
Consequently, learning to converse is precisely unlike “mastering [the] 
techniques and skills” of a game.4 Engaging in genuine conversation 
requires consideration of the relational and practical contexts that bear 
on the present situation; it demands that one allow oneself to be impli-
cated in one’s words, to realize that they imply commitments (both past 
and future) that extend beyond the present context. 
I
Stanley Cavell’s reading of The Winter’s Tale, “Recounting Gains, 
Showing Losses,” situates Leontes’s jealousy within the account of 
skepticism and acknowledgment sketched above. He reads Leontes’s 
jealous rage in acts 1 to 3 as a violent overcompensation for the radi-
cal skepticism that overcomes him when he finds himself unable to 
control or even decipher the behavior of his wife. This experience of 
paralysis, according to Cavell, leads Leontes to a perceived inability 
to say anything with certainty, which he can alleviate only by violently 
“theatricalizing” his wife; that is, by objectifying her as a character on a 
“stage,” completely present or transparent to the observer, who himself 
remains unseen.5 The underlying hamartia here is the typical failing 
of the skeptic, namely a demand for knowledge at a level where only 
acknowledgment will do; where what is needful is an acceptance of the 
enduring freedom and partial inscrutability of those he loves, and with 
it his own inability to control those loved ones’ actions and attitudes, 
particularly toward himself. 
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Cavell’s subtle reading focuses principally on Leontes, king of Sicilia 
and husband to Hermione, largely because Cavell sees skepticism as a 
peculiarly male predicament. Hermione, in this as in most accounts, 
is primarily a sufferer and, in her final restoration to life, a source of 
healing or redemption. The first task of the present essay is to supple-
ment this account by a reading of Hermione, via Rhees, as complicit in 
her husband’s repudiation of the conditions of human discourse. For 
if Leontes refuses the first condition sketched above, Hermione rejects 
the second. She helps to bring about Leontes’s theatricalization of her 
by what, in parallel to Leontes’s (anti)skepticism, might be called her 
sophism: her refusal to distinguish between rhetorical effectiveness and 
genuine conversation.6
The second task of this essay is to demonstrate that while Rhees’s 
work is thus capable of illuminating the concerns of The Winter’s Tale 
in unexpected ways, the play also complicates both Cavell’s and Rhees’s 
accounts of the possibility of discourse. It does so, specifically, by the 
pervasive and complex importance of what may be summarized as “theat-
ricality”—role-playing, pretense, and mutual casting in roles—in the play. 
The summaries of Cavell and Rhees above already hint at the difficult, 
ambiguous, or suppressed status of “theatricality” within their accounts 
of the human conversation. One consequence of Cavell’s insight that 
acknowledgment must be extended without firm or complete knowl-
edge or guarantee is that such acknowledgment is always vulnerable to 
deception. If there are no criteria to guard against “pretending,” then 
exposure to pretense cannot simply be banished from ordinary life. 
Rather, in Cavell’s view, we can only put aside the tendency to protect 
ourselves by role-playing and pretense “time after time, place by place.”7 
Rhees’s account of the unity of discourse, in turn, seems to depend 
on the casual assumption of an obvious (and therefore unformulated) 
difference between playacting and sincerity.8 However, just as Leontes 
is rattled by the unbanishable threat of pretense, Hermione unsettles 
the casually assumed distinction between playacting and sincerity; and 
although the play presents both of these attitudes as deeply problem-
atic, it refuses to extract itself entirely from the questions thrown up by 
its protagonists. This is true on a thematic as well as a formal level. In 
its thematic juxtaposition of Sicilia and Bohemia, and above all in its 
constant formal reflection on itself as theater, The Winter’s Tale reminds 
us of the inescapable involvement of ordinary action with “theatrical-
ity” and offers an example of how such theatricality is to be integrated 
rather than excised.
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II
Within a Rheesian-Wittgensteinian framework, the first long scene of 
The Winter’s Tale (1.2) represents an extreme example of a conception 
of language as a self-contained game rather than as part of a larger and 
interrelated dialogue. The three protagonists—Leontes, Hermione, and 
King Polixenes of Bohemia, Leontes’s childhood friend—are engaged 
in a playful dispute about a possible extension of Polixenes’s stay at 
the Sicilian court. The playfulness of this exchange is accentuated by 
the sporting terminology with which the friends self-reflexively com-
ment on their “moves,” and by the fact that arguments are weighed by 
their rhetorical dexterity rather than their sincerity. When Leontes fails 
to convince Polixenes to stay, Hermione comments on his rhetorical 
mistakes, and demonstrates in fencing terminology that with a more 
advantageous move, he could “beat [Polixenes] from his best ward” 
(1.2.33). Considering what strategy Polixenes might in turn employ to 
strengthen his position, she concludes that his strongest move would 
be to appeal to his desire to see his son (1.2.34). 
Throughout, Hermione regards Polixenes’s affection for his family 
purely as an argument he might deploy to his advantage in the present 
game. However, Polixenes’s plea “I may not, verily” (1.2.45) unsettles 
this casually assumed game context. Insisting on the veracity of his argu-
ment, Polixenes attempts to emphasize that his petition to leave is no 
mere element of a courtly game but a genuine appeal to an external 
exigency. Hermione, however, violently repudiates this possibility, and 
transposes Polixenes’s appeal to truthfulness itself into the parameters 
of the game, where “verily” becomes a mere word of power that she can 
use equally validly and—in her position of authority as his hostess—to 
greater advantage:
         Verily?
You put me off with limber vows; but I,
Though you would seek t’unsphere the stars with oaths,
Should yet say, “Sir, no going.” Verily,
You shall not go—a lady’s “verily”’s
As potent as a lord’s. Will you go yet?
Force me to keep you as a prisoner,
Not like a guest; so you shall pay your fees
When you depart, and save your thanks. How say you?
My prisoner or my guest? By your dread “verily,”
One of them you shall be. (1.2.45–55)
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Here, it becomes clear that Hermione regards conversation precisely 
as a game in which success depends on “mastering techniques and skills,” 
and in which, ultimately, nothing new is or can be said, because the game 
cannot be said to be “about” anything but itself.9 By thus denying the 
subjective and contingent aspect of the exchange, Hermione shuts out 
any possibility of understanding Polixenes’s appeal to external exigen-
cies, and (even more so) the claim these exigencies have on their game, 
and thus on her. While her speech succeeds in its aim, it also implies, 
ominously, that this success is only achieved by the game’s usurpation of 
reality, and by the possible coercion, rather than willing participation, 
of its players. Hermione will herself feel the consequences of this fact 
when her failure adequately to demarcate the boundary between play 
and sincerity ultimately results in her own arrest in the “play” scripted 
and imposed on her by her husband.
The immediate consequence of Hermione’s disregard for the contin-
gency of their game is that the casual assumption of an obvious (and 
therefore unformulated) difference between playacting and sincerity, 
which usually regulates role-playing and games like the one at hand, 
is unsettled. When Leontes returns and praises her for her successful 
persuasion of Polixenes, Hermione exuberantly urges him to tell her 
whether she has ever spoken “to better purpose” (1.2.89), pleading: 
“cram’s with praise, and make’s / As fat as tame things . . . / Our 
praises are our wages. You may ride’s / With one soft kiss a thousand 
furlongs” (1.2.90–94). Here, she continues to refract her relationships 
through her success as a rhetorician or actress by implicitly associating 
Leontes’s recognition for her rhetorical skills with her sexual satisfaction 
(1.2.93–94), her pregnancy (1.2.90–91), and her livelihood (1.2.93). 
Leontes gently tries to steer her away from this association, invoking 
a different meaning of “good speech” by tenderly recounting how 
Hermione consented to marry him:
Three crabbèd months had soured themselves to death
Ere I could make thee open thy white hand
And clap thyself my love; then didst thou utter
“I am yours for ever.” (1.2.101–4)
Hermione, however, chooses to ignore the dimension of sincerity 
and dedication that distinguishes this occasion from her recent success. 
Emphasizing the element of achievement rather than the importance 
of self-dedication in forming a successful relationship, she places her 
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declaration of love for Leontes on the same rhetorical level as her playful 
persuasion of Polixenes: “Why, lo you now, I have spoke to th’purpose 
twice. / The one for ever earned a royal husband, / Th’other, for some 
while a friend” (1.2.105–7). 
III
Despite the evident warmheartedness of Hermione’s reply, its more 
sinister implications are precisely and overpoweringly registered by 
Leontes. Unsettling the unquestioned assumption of his wife’s sincerity 
(grounded in, though not guaranteed by, their personal relationship), 
her remarks elicit a radical awareness of his inability to know whether 
her seemingly casual interaction with Polixenes is indeed casual or 
whether it is contrived, concealing illicit affection. This distinction, as 
Leontes’s ensuing speech confirms, cannot be reaffirmed by reference to 
an objective criterion, because contrived behavior and natural behavior 
look exactly alike. 
           Too hot, too hot!
To mingle friendship far is mingling bloods.
I have tremor cordis on me; my heart dances,
But not for joy, not joy. This entertainment
May a free face put on, derive a liberty
From heartiness, from bounty, fertile bosom,
And well become the agent—’t may, I grant.
But to be paddling palms and pinching fingers,
As now they are, and making practised smiles
As in a looking-glass, and then to sigh, as ’twere
The mort o’th’deer—O, that is entertainment
My bosom likes not, nor my brows. (1.2.107–18)
Hermione’s behavior is here centrally described as an “entertainment,” 
with its pertinent double meaning as “pastime” and “performance.” What 
may be “liberty,” flowing from “heartiness” and “bounty,” may equally 
be a display of “practised smiles” and affected sighs. Only a subjec-
tive arbitration differentiates the one from the other: Leontes’s “but” 
introduces not a counterargument but only an alternative description 
of the same actions.
At the sight of young Mamillius, Leontes realizes that the question 
whether his wife is faithful also entails the question whether his son is 
legitimate (“Art thou my boy?” [1.2.119]). This further question expresses 
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itself as the realization that his inability to interpret his wife affects him 
not only indirectly but also directly: it extends to his own issue. Mamillius, 
Leontes realizes, does not necessarily spring from Leontes’s own will 
and intention; the boy is not “his” in any absolute sense.10 
This destabilization of the relation between intention and issue begins 
to infect Leontes’s very language: in what he intends to be a casual 
conversation with his son, the meanings of his words multiply in a way 
that cannot conveniently be termed either intentional or fortuitous. He 
wants his son’s nose to be “neat” (1.2.122), but corrects the word to 
“cleanly” when he remembers that “neat” refers to horned cattle.11 This 
reference, in turn, prompts the image of a wanton calf, where “wanton” 
means both playful and sexually licentious, and “calf” suggests both 
offspring and a horned cuckold. 
Leontes’s sense of the unreliability of intention now escalates. 
Overwhelmed by the instability of his words, he immediately insists on 
the unreliability of speech in general: “women . . . will say anything” 
(1.2.129). Initially, he attempts to neutralize this uncertainty by appeal-
ing to the contrasting reliability of eyesight: “but were they false / As 
o’er-dyed blacks . . . yet were it true / To say this boy were like me” 
(1.2.129–30, 133–34). However, the attempt fails when he remembers 
his wife, and is again startled by the possibility that her behavior “may 
. . . be/ Affection” (I quote from the First Folio): 
          sweet Villaine,
Most dear’st, my Collop: Can thy Dam, may’t be
Affection? thy Intention stabs the Center.
Thou do’st make possible things not so held,
Communicat’st with Dreames (how can this be?)
With what’s vnreall: thou coactiue art,
And fellow’st nothing. Then ’tis very credent,
Thou may’st co-ioyne with something, and thou do’st,
(And that beyond Commission) and I find it,
(And that to the infection of my Braines,
And hardning of my Browes.) (1.2.136–45)
This notoriously convoluted passage, lamenting the unstable relation 
between intention and meaning, itself enacts this instability through 
the ambiguity of the terms affection (“love” or “affectation”) and inten-
tion (“meaning” or “purpose”)—an ambiguity compounded by the 
uncertainty of the speech’s subject. While Leontes intends to describe 
Hermione’s behavior (saying that her “affection” has unsettled the 
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“center” of his certainty by crossing the boundary between the real and 
the unreal), the erroneousness of his accusations subtly undermines this 
intention and creates a rebound effect, a secondary stratum of meaning 
in which the subject of the speech is Leontes himself. The core of the 
speech, on this subsidiary reading, is the (inadvertent) confession that 
the king’s skepticism has made him unable to distinguish between the 
possible and the impossible, and enclosed him in his own “dreams.” 
In other words, here, as in the later “Is whispering nothing?” speech, 
doubt about his wife’s sincerity manifests itself, on more than one level, 
as “the inability to say what exists; to say whether, so to speak, language 
applies to anything.”12 
This is Leontes’s breaking point. He abruptly terminates his thought by 
declaring, “Then ’tis very credent / Thou mayst co-join with something, 
and thou dost, / And that beyond commission” (1.2.141–43, emphasis 
added). In other words, he violently banishes his doubt by declaring 
with (false) authority that Hermione has transgressed her “commis-
sion”—that is, behaved contrary to his intention and the law. However, 
as he tacitly registers in the following lines, the consequence of such 
a claim to a definitive interpretation is the “infection of [his] brains / 
And hard’ning of [his] brows” (1.2.144–45)—a disease that demands 
not refutation, but healing. 
For Stanley Cavell, this radical antiskepticism is a predominantly male 
predicament. Similar to Cordelia in King Lear, Hermione is, for Cavell, 
an entirely innocent victim of her husband’s “skeptical” mania. In the 
present reading, by contrast, Hermione is by no means so uncomplicated 
a victim. Leontes’s impulse to theatricalize her is, rather, partly incited 
by her own refusal to acknowledge that if she will not be implicated in 
her words, her words will nonetheless implicate her—precisely by mak-
ing her into an actress. And the parallel goes even deeper. Hermione’s 
refusal to acknowledge the wider implications of her actions, to use 
language as more than a game in which she knows all the right moves, 
is, in its way, a failure almost as great as Leontes’s to acknowledge oth-
ers in their freedom and inscrutability: rather than offering herself as 
a wife, friend, and mother—risking rejection, disappointment, and 
solitude—she attempts to earn the affection of Leontes and command 
those of Polixenes (1.2.45–55) and Mamillius (2.1.22–23, 27, 29, 31). 
The consequences of both her and her husband’s “theatricalizations” 
escalate tragically in the ensuing trial, and both will be healed only by 
the “theatrical miracle” wrought in the final scene. Hermione’s assur-
ance to her ladies, in being escorted to prison, that “this action I now 
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go on / Is for my better grace” (2.1.121–22) heralds not the vindication 
she predicts but the grace of that miracle.
IV
The trial scene (3.2), thematically and structurally the pivotal scene of 
The Winter’s Tale, shows the disastrous consequences of both Hermione’s 
and (more radically) Leontes’s refusals of the ordinary. At the same 
time, it makes painfully clear that the challenges to ordinary human 
conversation raised by the antiskeptic and the sophist cannot easily be 
escaped, least of all in the context of a theatrical play. 
Hermione’s earlier deployment of “verily” as a word of power now 
comes to haunt her when Leontes, as king, arrogates the same right to 
himself, publicly confining her to a role within a play of his own devising 
whose boundaries are indeterminate. Hermione verbalizes this metathe-
atrical dimension of her predicament through her theatrical language. 
She acquiesces in her arrest with the sardonic pun, “the King’s will be 
performed” (2.1.115), recognizing that a factual defense is useless since 
(as she incisively observes) “mine integrity, / Being counted falsehood, 
shall, as I express it, / Be so received” (3.2.24–27). Her only hope, she 
realizes, is to plead the insufficiency of the role in which her husband 
has imprisoned her: “You, my lord, best know, / . . . my past life / Hath 
been as continent, as chaste, as true / As I am now unhappy, which is 
more / Than history can pattern, though devised / And played to take 
spectators” (3.2.31–36). 
But Leontes immediately folds this plea back into his theatricalization 
of his wife, identifying it with the typical subterfuges of the Vice char-
acter in a morality play: “I ne’er heard yet / That any of these bolder 
vices wanted / Less impudence to gainsay what they did / Than to 
perform it first” (3.2.53–56).13 Hermione now recognizes that Leontes’s 
totalizing narrative cannot be outstripped; its insistence on absoluteness 
will not tolerate boundaries, and Hermione’s only escape is death. “My 
life stands in the level of your dreams,” she capitulates, “which I’ll lay 
down” (3.2.79–80). 
It is indeed only death—the announced death of Mamillius—that 
rouses Leontes to the emotional recognition that he has “too much 
believed in [his] own suspicion” (3.2.149). But if this is anagnorisis, it 
fails to have the purifying effect we would expect. Like Lear’s recogni-
tion of Cordelia (King Lear 4.7) and Prospero’s abjuration of his magic 
(The Tempest 5.1), Leontes’s renunciation of his totalizing power results 
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not in genuine release for his fellow human beings but merely in the 
construction of a new incarcerating narrative. Lear gleefully consigns 
himself and Cordelia to prison, to dwell aloof from the affairs of ordi-
nary life as “God’s spies” (5.3). Prospero never solicits or verifies but 
merely announces his brother’s “penitence” (5.1.28), and so slips into 
the role of magnanimous pardoner the moment he relinquishes that 
of all-powerful avenger.14 Leontes, too, though he surrenders all accusa-
tions against his wife, immediately reaches for a new narrative in which 
Hermione is not a traitress but a spotless saint whose death brings upon 
him “shame perpetual” (3.2.236), driving him to “shut . . . himself up” 
(4.1.19) for sixteen years in unremitting penance. And Hermione, too, 
finds not release but merely a new role: she is now consigned to playing 
a dead woman. As is typical of Shakespeare’s late work, the climactic 
sequence of anagnorisis and catastrophe brings not catharsis but only 
a further twist to increasingly intractable problems. 
Shakespeare strains this strategy almost to breaking point by com-
pounding the horrors of the scene by a metatheatrical dimension that 
directly involves the audience in the problems they are witnessing. As far 
as one can speak of a “natural response” to the action so far, the natural 
response of the audience to the perceived disproportion of Leontes’s 
accusations is to take Hermione’s side, repudiating (i.e., rejecting as a 
possibility in their own lives) the violent skepticism into which Leontes 
has fallen. However, this natural response is to some extent predicated 
on ignoring or denying the close parallel that in fact obtains between 
Leontes’s perspective and their own. While the spectators are suspicious 
of Leontes’s accusations of dissembling, what they see on stage is in fact 
exactly what he sees: a display in which spontaneous affection cannot 
unproblematically be distinguished from theatrical craftsmanship. This 
foregrounding of the theatricality of The Winter’s Tale problematizes the 
“suspension of disbelief” on which the work of a dramatic performance 
traditionally depends—the audience’s casual construal of the actors’ 
performances as the spontaneous behavior of fictional characters. 
Furthermore, although the spectators may wish for Hermione’s exon-
eration and liberation, the very conditions of their sympathetic witness 
contribute to making this impossible. If the audience is to engage with 
her at all, it is by observing and being, to a certain extent, entertained by 
her: she is, to us, ultimately a figure in a play. This enforced complicity 
of the audience in Leontes’s tyranny escalates (along with everything 
else) in the trial scene. If audience members have, in an oft-reported 
response to Leontes’s progressing insanity, been plagued by a mounting 
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sense of paralysis in being unable to “set him right,” the trial scene clari-
fies and sharpens the source of this paralysis. Hermione’s protest that 
her grief is deeper than “history” (a narrative “of any sort, . . . including 
drama”15) “can pattern” makes it clear that not only her husband but 
also the spectators are trapping her in a role. This suggestion swells into 
a lament of her exposure, not only to the court but also as an actress 
to a theater audience: 
         For behold me,
A fellow of the royal bed, which owe
A moiety of the throne; a great king’s daughter,
The mother to a hopeful prince, here standing
To prate and talk for life and honour fore
Who please to come and hear. (3.2.36–41)
In his 2002 production of the play for the Royal Shakespeare 
Company (RSC), Matthew Warchus used the arena-like stage of the 
London Roundhouse to dramatize this metatheatrical dimension. The 
queen, tied center stage and overseen from a balcony by Leontes, was 
surrounded by closely grouped promenaders on a level with the actress. 
The director incorporated the promenaders into the scene as guards, 
surrounding the defendant’s platform holding a line of thick red rope. 
They were thus made to watch Hermione’s pathetic plea for release 
in full awareness both of her relative innocence and of the fact that 
they themselves (physically as well as figuratively) contributed to her 
detention; they are voyeurs as much as spectators. What is more, this 
condition could not and cannot be cured by the mere interruption of 
the action, the mere refusal to be an audience; such a refusal (as Cavell 
notes) would merely make the characters vanish, and the condition of 
both the characters (as “captives”) and the audience (as “perpetrators”) 
would be perpetuated rather than healed.16 What the audience, as much 
as Leontes and Hermione, needs is a working through rather than a 
repudiation of theatricality. 
V
The Bohemia sequence in act 4—characterized by the carnival mood 
of a festival, incessant changes of roles and costumes, and the outra-
geous fictions of its “master of ceremonies,” Autolycus—is a necessary 
step toward this resolution. 
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The anarchy or “unlawful” levity of the imagination is an object of fear 
to Leontes, and Bohemia may be interpreted as a product of Leontes’s 
mind that, like earlier “issues” of his imagination, eludes or exceeds the 
control of its creator.17 In act 1, Leontes had painted a pastoral picture 
of his youth, only to find its idyllic innocence threatened by a dagger 
that must be kept muzzled “lest it should bite its master and so prove, / 
As ornaments often do, too dangerous” (1.2.50–57). Now, Shakespeare 
presents Bohemia as another anarchic issue of Leontes’s imagination 
by reversing the locations of the story as given in his source, Greene’s 
Pandosto.18 This reversal exploits the fact that the pastoral genre origi-
nated in Sicily: the pastoral Bohemia, bordering on a fictitious sea, is 
literally a product of the Sicilian court. This also makes it a fitting home 
for the central pastoral figure, Perdita, another issue of the Sicilian king. 
These lines of origin link the Bohemia sequence inseparably to the 
problems of origination and theatricalization explored earlier, hinting 
that the conspicuous theatricality of this sequence must be confronted 
and integrated to work through these problems.
Many recent productions have responded to the intuitive recognition 
that act 4 treats the same difficult subjects as the first acts, and to the 
detection of a certain “unlawfulness” in its trivialization of these subjects 
by dark or ponderous interpretations of the Bohemia scenes, usually 
centering on a menacing Autolycus.19 The error of these interpretations 
lies in the assumption that the affinity of act 4 to the preceding acts 
signals a threatening subtext that must be brought out in performance. 
In fact, however, the “unlawfulness” of these scenes consists precisely in 
their resistance to weighty interpretations, and in their light and conven-
tional character. The transgressiveness of this frivolity is foregrounded 
from the beginning in Time’s entreaty to “impute it not a crime / To 
me or my swift passage that I slide / O’er sixteen years, and leave the 
growth untried / Of that wide gap” (3.3.4–7). Here, we hear a first 
foreshadowing of Paulina’s admonition, before rousing Hermione’s 
statue, that “those that think it unlawful business / I am about, let them 
depart” (5.3.95–96).
These entreaties also remind us that this potentially improper or 
unlawful action must be licensed or at least condoned by the audience. 
Shakespeare justifies the time gap between acts 3 and 4 by invoking the 
authority of “time.” However, the farcically conventional representa-
tion of Time as an old man with wings and an hourglass exposes this 
justification as a mere theatrical ruse, whose real authorization must 
be the imaginative assent of the spectators.20 Throughout, Time solicits 
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the audience’s imaginative participation, for example, with the quibble 
“let me pass” (4.1.9), which requests the double imaginative effort of 
“letting time pass” and “letting me (the actor) pass as Time.” 
The main justification Time offers for his transgression of the 
boundary between reality and fantasy, as well as of the classical unities 
of time, space, and action, is the entertainment value of his story (see 
4.1.29–32). This is also what accounts for the “theatrical perversity”21 
of the appearance of a bear at the end of act 3—a conventional device, 
according to Horace, to maintain audience attention “in the middle of a 
play.”22 Both Time and the experienced playwright, then, openly admit 
that the stage action, including the tragic happenings of the previous 
acts, are first of all devices to entertain the audience. This raises the 
reverse question of that raised in the first half of the play: not how to 
alleviate the weight of witnessing this drama, but how to deal with the 
unbearable lightness, the seeming insignificance, of the spectacle that 
has touched us so deeply. 
This question echoes throughout the Bohemia sequence, which 
openly trivializes the problems of bastardry, sexual license, disguise, the 
impenetrability of performance, and the paralysis of the audience. The 
tone of this treatment is set by the old shepherd’s discovery of Perdita. 
The shepherd does not doubt that “this has been some stair-work, some 
trunk-work, some behind-door work” (3.3.71–72), but decides to “take 
it up for pity” (3.3.74) anyway. (Is it this easy? we ask.) Then his son 
enters and reports a shipwreck and a bear’s attack, emphasizing the 
immediacy of the events: “the men are not yet cold under water, nor 
the bear half dined on the gentleman—he’s at it now” (3.3.101–2). His 
report, however, elicits a mere pro forma acknowledgment of the tragedy 
from his father (3.3.108–10). (What about the anguish caused by the 
spectators’ inability to act in the trial scene? we ask.) This carnivalization 
is epitomized in Autolycus’s equally outrageous and gullibly accepted 
claims that the fantastic texts of his ballads are true: 
autolycus. Here’s one to a very doleful tune, how a usurer’s wife was 
brought to bed of twenty money-bags at a burden, and how she longed 
to eat adders’ heads and toads carbonadoed.
mopsa. Is it true, think you?
autolycus. Very true, and but a month old. (4.4.260–5)
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But if the levity of the imagination can be a cause of unease, it is also 
tremendously liberating, and the Bohemia scenes, at their best, are an 
exuberant and delightful theatrical spectacle.23 This sense of liberation 
is rooted in the suggestion, repeated throughout the sequence, that 
role-playing (or -casting) can be a means not only of concealing one’s 
identity or fixing that of another person but also of finding one’s iden-
tity or giving another person the imaginative space to find it. The most 
articulate exponent of this view, as we will see in a moment, is Florizel. 
The persistent tension between “unlawfulness” as transgression of and 
exemption from the limits or laws of identity and origin escalates in the 
final scenes of the Bohemia sequence, with their threat of disownment 
and violent death, sparking a firework of disguises and implausible 
journeys. These scenes, leading the Bohemian pastorals back to their 
place of origin in Sicilia, recall characters and spectators to the claim 
that such origins have on that world, and of the eventual need to inte-
grate the two. 
The most eloquent advocate of the liberating power of role-playing in 
the Bohemia sequence is Florizel. Before the feast begins, Perdita appears 
garlanded with flowers, and the prince (himself in disguise) praises the 
costume for underlining and creatively accounting for the girl’s native 
nobility, which remains unexplained by her (supposed) origin: 
These your unusual weeds to each part of you
Does give a life; no shepherdess, but Flora
Peering in April’s front. This your sheep-shearing
Is as a meeting of the petty gods,
And you the queen on’t. (4.4.1–5)
Perdita, by contrast, diffidently dissociates herself from her role; it is 
only the conventions of this festival that foist it on her and avert the 
otherwise unbearable embarrassment of having claimed a place (and 
beauty) not her own (4.4.10–14). 
When Perdita voices her concern about an expected reproach by 
Florizel’s father, he comforts her by invoking the precedent of the gods, 
who, like him, have assumed disguises for the sake of love: 
          Apprehend 
Nothing but jollity. The gods themselves,
Humbling their deities to love, have taken
The shapes of beasts upon them. Jupiter
Became a bull and bellowed; the green Neptune
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A ram and bleated; and the fire-robed god,
Golden Apollo, a poor humble swain, 
As I seem now. (4.4.24–31)
This deployment of (pastoral) myths is markedly different from that of 
the courtiers in act 1 (1.1.20–30; 1.2.61–74; 1.2.152–57). While Polixenes 
and Leontes attempted to freeze the Edenic image of their childhood 
into a myth of origin unassailable by the threats of sexuality and the 
imagination encountered as adults, Florizel does not invoke mythology 
in order to achieve distance and invulnerability but to create a space 
in which the native nobility he perceives in Perdita is imaginatively 
accounted for, and in which he can give himself to her: “or I’ll be thine, 
my fair, / Or not my father’s. For I cannot be / Mine own nor anything 
to any if / I be not thine. To this I am most constant, / Though destiny 
say no” (4.4.41–46).
Florizel’s own disguise as a shepherd expresses as well as serves this 
desire. It embodies his readiness to surrender himself and his princely 
position to Perdita, and allows him to be truthful in a way that his usual 
identity bars. A. D. Nuttall comments on this paradox:
Florizel . . . means what he says. But were he an artful rhetorician of 
the court, Perdita could not help but doubt him. As it is, his pastoral 
pretense has lifted him out of the self-consuming prison of rhetoric into 
the possibility of truthfulness. Throughout the scene, playing-acting [sic] 
is a means of revelation, not of concealment.24
Apart from an explicit allusion to the Ovidian gods, there is also an 
implicit parallel to Christ, who, for the love of his people, “made himself 
of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant” (Philippians 
2:7), and who often described himself as the “good shepherd” (John 
10:1–16). This parallel reinforces the idea of self-surrender, and of the 
assumption of a role not to augment but to empty one’s proper self.
However, disguise is only a “means of revelation” as long as it merely 
suspends, but does not downright deny, the origin or antecedent identity 
of the actor, and insists on being a complete and sufficient condition for 
presence. In The Winter’s Tale, the consequence of such a claim (i.e., that 
one’s disguise is not accountable to an antecedent identity) is inversely 
parallel to that of the claim that knowledge of origins is a sufficient 
condition for presence (i.e., that such knowledge is not relativized by 
the partial theatricality of all presence). Both lead to the formation of 
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a fiction of absolute access to identity, which disallows the person to 
whom it is imputed to emancipate him- or herself from a fixed narrative 
and experience genuine encounters. 
This is most forcefully demonstrated in Perdita’s repeated denials of 
the theatrical origin of her pastoral identity. When Polixenes questions 
her about the absence of carnations and streaked gillyvors in her garden, 
she replies that she dislikes them, since “there is an art which in their 
piedness shares / With great creating nature” (4.4.87–88). Polixenes 
challenges her denunciation of grafting, but Perdita insists that she will 
not “set one slip of them; / No more than, were [she] painted, [she] 
would wish / This youth should say ’twere well, and only therefore / 
Desire to breed by [her]” (4.4.100–3). By construing authenticity as 
“naturalness” and claiming that she is exempt from the intervention of 
art or artifice, Perdita denies the truth that her own identity as a shep-
herd’s daughter is already an illusion and less true to her real station 
than her role as queen of the feast. In other words, she locks herself 
into a nostalgic fiction of unstained purity akin to that of Leontes in act 
1, and thus inadvertently confirms her descent from him. 
Similarly, by using pastoral conventions without awareness of their 
literary context, she unwittingly forces Florizel into the role of a deceased 
Arcadian youth mourned by a shepherdess. She laments her lack of 
spring flowers (presented in a mythically inflected catalogue) to make 
garlands for the shepherdesses and for her “sweet friend, / To strew 
him o’er and o’er.” Florizel provocatively replies: “what, like a corpse?” 
(4.4.128–30), pointing out both that her remark implies that he is 
dead, as pastoral youths strewn with flowers usually are, and that she is 
unwittingly turning him into a fictional persona, similar to how Leontes 
has theatricalized Hermione. Her reply to this provocative suggestion 
confirms this association, but also enigmatically points beyond itself 
to Hermione’s later revival. Rather than denying Florizel’s conclusion, 
Perdita affirms that insofar as he is her lover, he is also a corpse, and 
what is more, a living corpse: “not like a corpse; or if, not to be buried, 
/ But quick, and in mine arms” (4.4.131–32, emphasis added).
The consequences of refusing accountability to one’s antecedent 
identity are enacted in Florizel’s encounter with his father. Polixenes 
has joined the feast in disguise to observe his son. He is enticed by the 
spectacle and its hostess, and is ready to admit that “nothing she does or 
seems / But smacks of something greater than herself, / Too noble for 
this place” (4.4.157–59). Furthermore, his examination of the sincerity 
of his son’s affection (4.4.340–64) and repeated appeal to Florizel to 
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inform his father of his intended marriage (4.4.386–99) suggest that he 
may be willing to authenticate Perdita’s seeming nobility by raising her 
to the position of Florizel’s wife, provided that his son admits his and her 
true identity to the father and solicits his permission for the marriage. 
Florizel, however, stubbornly refuses to do so, thus effectively divorcing 
himself from his father and therewith the possibility of integrating his 
diverging identities. The father’s violent response reflects this radical 
self-alienation:
Mark your divorce, young sir,
Whom son I dare not call—thou art too base
To be acknowledged, thou a scepter’s heir,
That thus affects a sheep-hook! 
. . . And thou fresh piece
Of excellent witchcraft, whom of force must know
The royal food thou cop’st with . . .
I’ll have thy beauty scratched with briars and made
More homely than thy state. (4.4.414–23)
The Bohemia scenes end in a state of divorce and self-alienation similar 
to that in which the Sicilia scenes conclude.
VI
If the attempt to escape one’s impulse to “theatricalize” by violently 
repudiating one’s own formerly assumed knowledge of the other leads 
merely to the converse, namely the idolization of the other as a figure 
of purity beyond one’s own reach, then how is theatricalization to be 
overcome? Not by an assessment of knowledge but by an admission of 
desire. This is the work of the statue scene (5.3). In this culminating 
scene, Leontes perceives himself as facing the same threat as in the 
trial scene: the threat of “believing too much in his own suspicion.” 
Paulina actively fosters this conviction that it is merely his own fancy that 
believes the statue to be alive, warning him, “No longer shall you gaze 
on’t, lest your fancy / May think anon it moves” (5.3.60–61). Leontes’s 
response is not an insistence on knowledge or ignorance but a confes-
sion of desire that the statue may precisely be more than what it seems 
to him, that it may have a life of its own—indeed, a recognition that his 
own life depends on the object of this desire, while he has no power to 
enforce it. In other words, for Leontes, integration requires more than 
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a mere renunciation of the claim that he can authoritatively decipher 
Hermione’s behavior, just as for Prospero in the near-contemporaneous 
Tempest, reintegration into human society necessitates more than the 
mere abjuration of his magic.25 
Prospero’s final insight into his own condition as a theatrical figure in 
the epilogue of The Tempest becomes a solitary plea for acknowledgment, 
placed in the hands of the audience who must affirm their unbridge-
able separation from him by the very expression of their sympathy, 
applause.26 Leontes’s acknowledgment of his condition, by contrast, is 
not made in isolation but precisely in and through an identification with 
Hermione as she has become through his guilt: “I am ashamed. Does 
not the stone rebuke me / For being more stone than it?” (5.3.37–38). 
By accepting Hermione’s death-like rigidity as his own, Leontes fastens 
his own life to the hope that she lives: “would I were dead, but that 
methinks already” she moves (5.3.62). Unable to enforce this hope, 
however, he can only be “content to look on” what Paulina “can make 
her do” (5.3.91–92). The faith in Hermione (and Paulina) expressed by 
this self-surrender releases his wife from her imprisonment and allows 
her to be herself again. 
But the “theatrical miracle” wrought here is not only Hermione’s 
release from the totalizing grasp of her husband but also her own 
recovery. In allowing herself to be presented as a statue, Hermione 
acknowledges that the role of actress was not merely unjustly imposed 
on her but also existentially implicates her, and that in two ways. The 
first and more obvious is that she has helped to bring it about by what 
I have called her sophism: her refusal to distinguish between rhetorical 
effectiveness and genuine relationship, to integrate her discourse (and 
with it herself) within a wider communal whole. She has made herself 
into an actress, and her transformation from a statue to a woman is, 
among other things, an act of relinquishing this aloofness from ordinary 
human life and accepting her own vulnerable humanity. She must choose 
to come down from the pedestal.
The second is related to the first but is perhaps even more difficult 
and delicate. Leontes’s tyrannous grasp existentially implicates Hermione 
because, as Leontes’s wife, she is not a fully autonomous being but partly 
dependent for her own identity on her partner’s acknowledgment or 
withdrawal. This is one of the persistent strains of the late plays. Florizel 
first sounds it in The Winter’s Tale when he confesses to Perdita: “I cannot 
be / Mine own nor anything to any if / I be not thine” (4.4.41–46). It 
is echoed at the climax of each of the late plays. Gonzalo remarks with 
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wonder just before the return to Milan at the close of The Tempest how 
“all of us [found] ourselves / When no man was his own” (5.1.205–13). 
Marina, at the close of Pericles, offers her story, and with it her identity, 
to the king to be acknowledged or rejected. The aged king, conversely, 
is reborn in the recognition of his daughter: “thou that begett’st him 
that did thee beget” (21.182). If this is a version of Christ’s “whosoever 
shall lose his life shall preserve it” (Luke 17:33), it inflects that exhorta-
tion with the inescapable relationality of the self—its dependence on 
the love and recognition of others. 
In the excruciating hundred lines of stillness before her “resurrec-
tion,” Hermione bears the silence to which her sophistic chatter in the 
first scenes has reduced her. Rather than attempting to coerce or cajole, 
she offers herself to her husband in silence, making herself completely 
dependent on his response. Cavell describes the statue scene as a “new 
sacrament . . . of marriage.”27 “In [Genesis],” he writes, “the origin of 
marriage is presented as the creation of the woman from the man,” 
suggesting that the “ceremony of union takes the form of a ceremony 
of separation”: two can only become one because one has first become 
two.28 “It is separation that Leontes’ participation in parturition grants—
that Hermione has . . . a life beyond his, and that she can create a life 
beyond his and hers. . . .”29 But if Leontes needs to learn true separate-
ness, Hermione needs to learn true relatedness. While separation has 
only to be acknowledged, union has to be offered and received—and 
it is this second step that constitutes the miracle of this scene.
The restoration achieved in the statue scene also extends to the audi-
ence. Hermione’s resurrection demonstrates that the dexterity of the 
imagination does not necessarily imply frivolity, but rather involves real 
risk and accomplishes real work. Paulina’s exhortation, “it is required 
you do awake your faith” (5.3.94–95), is addressed to the audience as 
well as to Leontes: it is by their imaginative consent that the spectacle on 
stage can take place. Thus, by contrast to the trial scene, spectatorship 
is now construed not as voyeurism, but as creative “work.” At the same 
time, Paulina makes it clear that the audience must “awake their faith” 
not in a religious but in a theatrical sense; that is, they must suspend 
their disbelief. This means that the very act of restoring Hermione also 
distances the audience from her: only by admitting that she is a theatrical 
figure can they bring her to life at all. Thus, the scene at once awakes 
longing for full encounter and enacts the impossibility of such fullness 
in the present context. In this way, it leads the audience back to the 
ordinary. Leontes spells it out when he leads his friends away in order 
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that “each one [may] demand and answer to his part / Performed in 
this wide gap of time since first / We were dissevered” (5.3.153–55). The 
play has not only introduced but also dissevered them from themselves, 
and healing can only take place if it is brought to an end.
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